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The central argument is that methods are designed with aims in mind, and are determined 
by one’s worldview and/or ontology and/or philosophical anthropology and/or views of 
scholarship. It is possible, and here shown by analysis of the methodology of William James, 
that obsession with a cause, driven by the elitist belief that my cause is for everybody’s 
advantage, can take an ideological format (a formalistic ideology), in which case it would show 
tendencies to polarise. In the case of James the scientistic methodology takes as primary target 
Christianity’s meekness and kindness as humanitarianly ineffective. But James suffers from 
the problem of intellectual solipsism: reading Christianity via abstract rationalist theology. 
An impractical God and his weak followers
You are not like us; therefore you are unacceptable. You serve different gods, other gods; the 
wrong ones. You have strange faces; the image of a very strange god, who wants you to love your 
enemy. This is impractical, even dangerous. But: we can show you a method to become like us. These 
may be the imaginary words of a Modern secularly religious invitation to orthodoxly religious 
people.
Some people appear to be perpetual xenoi in the world; amongst others serious Christians. What’s 
wrong with them? How can they become worldly and be at-home-in-the-world? Can we show 
them the way or method to make them skilled in our ways? Can we make them understand that 
they have chosen the wrong way? 
Hasn’t Modernity itself alienated the subject from its environment? Made it a stranger? Hasn’t 
the Kantian an sich [per se] really become but a ‘Ding’ [thing]? Isn’t there truth in the Neo-Marxist 
idea of the reification of all – except certain egos? 
The ‘strangers’ – are they real co-subjects that make a valuable contribution to the humankind’s fate? 
This question is at the centre of this article. William James appears to argue that Christianity is 
other-worldly. It does not really touch the mud and gore of everyday life. It is hanging in the idea-
clouds and never becomes true in our world. This publication is part of a methodologically focused 
series, via analytical exegesis of texts. James’s method of attack will be my main focus; alternative 
ways of looking at Christianity will also be considered at specific points. 
Method, institutional power and modernity
In the history of Western thought since Hellenistic Scepticism, one power struggle entrenched 
itself in scholarly methodology: that between church and state. The conflict between church and 
state exacerbated the tensions between religion and science, or faith and reason, for religion and 
faith was associated with ‘church’ whilst ‘science’ and ‘reason’ became connected with state. 
Yet neither of these conceptual associations implied any necessary connections. During the 
Renaissance this struggle reached breaking point; the state emerged victorious. What kind of a 
state? And how might this be related to scholarly method? 
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Pragmatisme se aanval op Christenheid – Teikeningsmetodologieë. Die sentrale argument 
is dat metodes ontwerp word met doeleindes in gedagte en bepaal word deur ’n persoon 
se werklikheidsvisie en/of ontologie en/of filosofiese antropologie en/of sienings van 
wetenskap. Dit is moontlik dat ’n obsessie met ’n saak, gedryf deur die elitistiese oortuiging 
dat my saak tot almal se voordeel is, ’n ideologiese formaat kan aanneem (’n formalistiese 
ideologie). In so ’n geval toon dit neigings om te polariseer. Ter illustrasie hiervan, is William 
James se metodologie in hierdie artikel geanaliseer. In James se geval neem die sciëntistiese 
metodologie die Christendom se sagmoedigheid en welwillendheid as primêre teiken om 
aan te toon dat dit op humanitêre vlak oneffektief is. James ly egter aan die probleem van 
intellektuele solipsisme: hy lees die Christendom via abstrakte, rasionalistiese teologie.
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The straight jacket of method
From the point of view of methods developed for targeting the 
Christian xenoi, there are two kinds:
• those that focus on the (different) weaknesses of 
supposedly ‘authentic’ Christianity to cope with the issues 
of the day, for example Machiavelli and William James
• those that put the knife into the deviations, the evils and 
the crimes committed by Christians in the name of Christ 
(for example Hobbes and Voltaire). 
Christian weaklings? Heads in the clouds, feet nowhere near 
the ground! Thus sayeth William James. Yet when we read 
James, his polar approach was that of a propagandist – he 
propagates a view of religion and shows Christianity to be 
no-good for it does not fit into his mould. His style of writing 
therefore deviates from the standard academic writing of his 
time (for example that of his close friend, Peirce). In a fairly 
popular style he seems to tell us what to think by teaching us 
how to think. 
Heidegger was struggling with the issue of method all 
through his career. He called ‘method’ the shackles of 
Modernity. Method, for him – as a late-Romantic mystic – 
was taking a road to where one already is. This is reminiscent 
of Augustine’s Noli foras ire. In te ipsum redi. In interiore hominis 
habitat veritas [Do not go outside. Go back into yourself. 
Truth dwells in the inner person]. The real method, argued 
Heidegger, had to be self-delivery to the logos – the original 
word that was the house of being (cf. Venter 1995:190ff). 
He had a good understanding of the making of Modernity. 
Since Bacon, Galileo and Descartes, over Locke, Vico, 
Turgot and Kant, then Comte, Mill, Dilthey and Marx, up 
to Husserl (at least), the struggle was not only for a good 
scholarly method but also about a new one. It makes no sense 
to propagate a new method if one cannot also claim that it 
is better in reaching the required scholarly aims than all the 
previous ones. James claimed a peculiarity of method, which 
is an improvement on the existing method and at least 
transcending weaknesses of religion. 
Faddism and novelty
Pragmatism claimed a special identity given the particular 
character of its – all too ancient – method. Is it new or is it 
old? The struggle for the new in Modernity has its roots in the 
Renaissance, when Classicism – recovering the ‘old’ – was the 
basis of the ‘new’. Modernity could not divorce itself from the 
Medieval idea of the authority of the old; yet simultaneously 
it remained in revolutionary mood, attempting clear breaks 
with the past. The difficulty was: how to claim an original 
contribution that would stand out in the great stream of 
history? Humanism wanted human beings to be creative in 
the same sense as God-creating – from beyond-inside history. 
Too much innovation becomes faddist (a trend amongst so-
called ‘Post-Modernists’). Too strong a rejection of all the 
previous in order to highlight one’s (possibly not so very 
new) innovations, leads to scepticism and relativism, which 
calls for an authoritative historical foundation: the Ancients 
had already seen … what I see … Historical stances show a 
dialectic of absolutisms and relativisms. 
A Hellenistic Sceptic witticism has it that amongst 
philosophers if one milks a goat the other will hold a sieve 
underneath. Every philosopher holds that only he or she 
has the truth and all the others are wrong. Modernity could 
not avoid the same fate, at least according to the later 20th 
century thinker, Feyerabend (1975): 
The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and 
absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of 
science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the 
results of historical research. We find, then, that there is not a 
single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded 
in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or other. It 
becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events, 
they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention 
that might be avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are 
necessary for progress. Indeed, one of the most striking features 
of recent discussions in the history and philosophy of science, is 
the realisation that events and developments … occurred only 
because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain 
obvious methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke 
them. This liberal practice, I repeat is not just a fact of the history 
of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the 
growth of knowledge. (p. 23)
Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth freaks 
and liars – they all are invited to participate in the contest and 
to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture. The 
task of the scientist is, however, no longer to ‘search for the truth’ 
or ‘praise god’ or to ‘systematise observations’, or ‘to improve 
predictions’. These are but side-effects of an activity to which 
his attention is now mainly directed and which is to make the 
weaker case the stronger as the Sophists said, and thereby to 
sustain the motion of the whole. (Feyerabend 1975:30)
Feyerabend (1975) sees the dialectic, but does not solve it. 
His reading matter included Lenin, Hegel, Mill, Kropotkin, 
Strindberg, Cohn-Bendit, Dadaism and other revolutionaries. 
He called himself an anarchist. However, he undergirds 
his work by inserting himself surreptitiously in the older 
methodological tradition (as Heidegger, for all his attempts 
to approach a poetic style, also did). Feyerabend’s book 
entitled Against method (1975) shows a clear plan to elucidate 
(if not demonstrate) his viewpoint that theories and rules have 
really never mattered that much in science. Yet Pragmatism, 
Feyerabend’s near predecessor, as will be shown below, 
identifies itself solely by the peculiarity of its method (and 
thus the rules of thumb accompanying such a method). 
Feyerabend does see the important discontinuities clearly; 
the problem is that he suppresses the continuities that are 
present (even shining through in his own work). It could 
be exactly the limitations of being-human in thinking (such 
as readability and comprehensibility), that enforces some 
continuities. 
Science and person
Feyerabend (1975:25) saw that methods contained hidden 
strategies (such strategies often being not-so-nice) – a well-
Page 2 of 16
Original Research
doi:10.10.4102/koers.v78i2.61http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 3 of 16
trained rationalist was a ‘brainwashed’ person who did 
not even realise that the appeal to reason was ‘a political 
manoeuvre’ . Though quite strongly stated, the issue of power 
– usually connected with reason and with secular power 
structures, such as the state in its struggle against the church, 
has always been part of rationalism. In the history of the idea 
of ‘rationality,’ – it being a totalitarian conception rather than 
a clearly definable concept – the social power structures in 
the environment (though surely not the only components) 
do shine through: Medieval rationality proposed a purely 
logical search for God; middle Modernity a peaceful morality 
favouring humankind as summit of reality; since the 19th 
century rationality became competition for own advantage; 
in the area of Pragmatism it is focused into goal-directed 
mastery and self- or social advantaging (cf. further Venter 
2012a, 2012b). 
Galileo Galilei, Feyerabend says, had been a real chancer and 
an intellectual thief (1975:99ff) – and in spite of his pretended 
anarchism, he does provide some evidence for this. 
Feyerabend (1975) did see the reduction of the scientific 
person: being squashed into the narrow borders of being-
a-scientist, even a special scientist, working under the strict 
rules of methodological purification: 
A person’s religion, for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense 
of humour (his natural sense of humour and not the inbred and 
always rather nasty kind of jocularity one finds in specialised 
professions) must not have the slightest connection with his 
scientific activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his 
language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the 
nature of scientific ‘facts’ which are being experienced as being 
independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background. (p. 19)
He did also sense the deep tensions brought about by 
philosophical bias, religion, power struggles and so forth. He 
did not attempt to reconcile them: he followed a dialectical 
revolutionary anarchist approach. And yet not: the dialectical 
tensions have to lead somewhere: one has to increase 
knowledge and keep the cultural snowball rolling. Outcomes 
are important – yet undecidable. 
However, his anarchism did not come out victorious: 
something more basic to Western thought won the day, 
namely technical specialism (a kind of method-ism). This 
was a return to early Modernity in an Irrationalist form 
called Pragmatism. Machiavelli, to be discussed in another 
article, and Hobbes, do show the early Modern tendencies 
recovered in Pragmatism, especially the naturalistic limiting 
of expected outcomes. Natural(istic) outcomes are important; 
the manner of reaching them effectively even more. The main 
issue here was: Is efficiency subject to norms or is any approach 
that ‘works’ acceptable? 
Jamesian pragmatism
The question just posed surfaced acutely with the advent 
of Pragmatism towards the 1870s. It was at that stage that 
Peirce and James began to formulate their own format of 
Irrationalism, called Pragmatism. Only decades before 
Auguste Comte had begun to move away from strict 
scientism to a kind of sentimentalist moralistic mastery of the 
natural world. 
Action and its meaning
Since the 18th century human life – had been seen – at least 
by intellectuals – as (ideally) one of activism, the French 
Revolution and the Bolschevik revolution being summits 
of such activity. But the West was also shocked by yet more 
brutalities committed in the name of justice, as well as the 
swell of reactionary activism in Metternich, Bismarck, the 
Napoleontic wars and more than one Napoleon. 
Modern activism has its roots in the faith in progress. This was 
a transformation, by and large, of the 12th – 13th century 
historical group mysticism of the Joachimists. Christian 
mysticism usually has been and still is a mystical journey 
of the individual soul. Joachim of Fiore (11th – 12th century) 
transformed the Augustinian individual mystical road 
– sense, reason, intuition – into a group-elitist historically 
progressive one: old Testament Jewish sensuality moving up 
to New Testament Christian rationality summiting in a New 
Jerusalemist intellectually-intuitive mysticism. When by 
the mid–13th century there had been no progress towards 
a popeless, churchless New Jerusalem (as predicted), the 
Joachimists tried to twist the hand of God, using violence 
to promote progress. Mysticism always had an elitist trait, 
but a lonely mystic-in-ecstacy was barely a social danger. 
The group mysticism of the Joachimists introduced group 
superiority and thus rationalised manipulations from ‘above’. 
One has but to read Lessing, or Mozart’s librettos, to see a 
secularist recovery of Joachimistic philosophy in Modernity. 
For so many centuries Europe had been struggling to throw of 
the yoke of the nobility acting in cahoots with an established 
church. When the faith in progress and the human kingdom 
of God did not produce progress, Modernity attempted to 
twist the hand of historical human reality, by revolution and 
violence. Given secularism, Christianity became a serious culprit. 
Ego’s self-reflection delivered xenoi as things-in-themselves 
useful for, but not really fellow subjects of the Modern 
agenda1. 
Since Machiavelli and Hobbes, Rationalism had a clear 
agenda: human well-being, material welfare, peace and stability. 
Activism had taken hold of the European mind (note the 
utopian attempts of the 19th century). But how to make sense of 
action? The Humanist agenda had to be reached by activism 
– war, competition, exploitation, et cetera being a necessary 
part of it. Voltaire, in Candide and his Dictionnaire philosophique 
portative (1765, s.v. bien) struggled with this Leibnizian idea 
that evil has to be an essential part of (attaining) the good. 
Marcuse says: ‘human life is a life worth living (cf. Marcuse 
1.I am using the term ‘agenda’ to indicate a broad intention that was in discussion 
since the Renaissance thinker, Bacon, and explicitly in Descartes. The very idea 
of Humanism was to work rationally, and later irrationally, for health and peace. 
The outcomes were mostly opposite. Latour (1993) calls these broad intentions, 
together with its conceptualisation, the ‘constitution’ of Modernity. The term 
agenda covers only one aspect of this – the ‘agenda’. Most of Modern intention, 
culture was aimed at fulfilling this agenda. 
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1966:x)’. Why would human life have any worth at all? How 
to make sense of participating in this activism? 
Making sense of action, or rather human-centered activism, 
was part of the issue in Nietzsche’s strange form of ‘nihilism’; 
of Marx’s and Engels’s revolutionary doctrines; even more 
so in Blondel’s L’action. Auguste Comte, who had rejected 
all ultimate ‘why’s’ in favour of laws expressing observable 
regularities, realised that Positivistic natural science in itself 
made no sense. Having been part of Saint-Simon’s activism 
in favour of the lower classes, he surreptitiously reinserted 
an ultimate ‘why’: Humanity as God, thus falling back on an 
ontology of human advantage (cf. Venter 2012b:ch. 6). 
Interestingly William James counted Blondel – a modernised 
Roman Catholic transcendentalist – amongst the ‘fellow’ 
Pragmatists of his days (James 1913:viii). They shared a strong 
interest in human action but surely found different meanings 
for it. Blondel’s argument was that of a transcendental 
meaning; an explicit meeting with the grace of God 
(Kierkegaard?) at the horizon of experience. James, surely, 
would call this taking a legitimate moral holiday. He took the 
opposite route: empiricism rather than transcendentalism. 
Yet the search for empirical facts, as Comte and others had 
already seen, provided no internal meaningfulness.
James hooked onto this directionlessness, pretending not to 
have any doctrine at all, but only searching for the empirical 
effects of our ideas. One had but to relate fact to fact in a 
consistent way. But why? What for? What ‘sense’ would this 
operation have? 
Being at some distance from the ‘Christianity’ of his days, 
he must have had hidden Humanistic norms such as human 
advantage. His search – given his examples – was not simply 
for effects but for those effects that Feyerabend later also 
searched for: ‘good’ ones! And ‘goodness’ for him did not lie in 
the transcendental (religious) direction without (Pragmatist) 
ado. Groothuis (2013), following Bertrand Russell, argues 
critically that to execute James’s idea of truth, one needs to 
know in advance what ‘goodness’ means and also whether a 
specific idea will have such effects. Thus one needs to have a 
supreme truth that gives the criteria of goodness and needs to 
assume the truth of presupposed logico-causal relationships 
that will make any other idea conform to the supreme truth. 
James curiously avoids talking about the great secular 
revolutionary events of Modernity (embarrassing?) – the 
bloodshed for the sake of good effects – and focused on the 
relationship between ideas and individual situations. Here one 
could more easily show the ‘Rationalists’ at fault (and among 
these put the Christian weaklings near the ‘bull’s eye’). He 
must have read Modernity solely via thinkers like Hegel, not 
to have realised the anti-Christian secularism in Rationalism 
itself. 
Focusing on James’s famous book, Pragmatism (2013), I shall 
try to show how such hidden presuppositions determined 
a skewed presentation of the world of thought and 
Christianity’s place in it. 
Personal temperament and human action: The 
problem of comparison
In his famous series of lectures delivered in 1907 in Boston 
and New York, published under the title, Pragmatism: a new 
name for some old ways of thinking, James distinguished two 
temperaments in philosophy: the tender-minded and the tough-
minded (James 1913:12). He summarised the characteristics of 
the two temperaments in a table (see Table 1).
To distinguish intentionally is a question of valid comparison. 
At the basis of all scientific analysis lies the issue of 
comparison; an intentionally planned process of distinction. This 
is probably the most complex part of scholarly analysis. 
Tabling surely is a form of comparison, but not the other 
way round: comparison is not simply a listing of or tabling 
of similarities and differences. For tabling hides the deeper 
issues regarding valid comparison. Normatively stated, it 
should not be limited to listing, since:
• a comparison has an aim
• the aim (subjective side) and the nature of the compared 
(objective side) ought to meet
• these two determine the points of comparison.
Normally a comparison aims at showing that either 
similarities or differences dominate; it wants to conclude 
to a familial relationship or a non-familial relationship. (Of 
course there may be undecidables.) Once such a relationship 
has been established this can be used for further purposeful 
argument. More than simply tabling similarities and 
differences, comparison is (or could be) related to ‘equation’ 
in algebra and/or arithmetic: a + b − 21 = c − a. 
This says (and note it is a norm for the process of numerical 
comparing):
If you have an amount a, and you add an amount b, and you 
subtract an amount of 21, 
then the sum ought to be equal to an amount c, from which 
one subtracts the amount a.
From this it is possible (given enough information in the 
equation) to deduce in terms of the oughts for deduction: the 
value (amount or quantity) of c, or of b, or of a. 
What value(s) do we deduce? In the present case that or those 
that serve James’s intentions. The objects have been chosen 
to suit the aim. In the majority of cases the compared and 
determined values will not be numerical. One has to note 
TABLE 1: Summary of characteristics.
Nr Tender-minded Nr Tough-minded
1 Rationalistic (going by principles) A Empiricist (going by facts)
2 Intellectualistic B Sensationalistic
3 Idealistic C Materialistic
4 Optimistic D Pessimistic
5 Religious E Irreligious
6 Free-willest F Fatalistic
7 Monistic G Pluralistic
8 Dogmatical H Sceptical 
Original Research
doi:10.10.4102/koers.v78i2.61http://www.koersjournal.org.za
Page 5 of 16
that an equation is a deductive form of argument. What comes 
out in the conclusion has to be in the premises. Comparisons, 
being analogies of equations, have to show the outcome-
values as derived from the elements compared. The values we 
end up with ought implicitly be part of the argument, already 
from the point of departure. 
This poses a danger: one can select one’s points of departure 
so that a required conclusion simply has to follow; or one can 
purposefully combine them with an implicit agenda. Or: one 
can read – consciously or unconsciously – meanings into the 
elements compared to suit one’s agenda; this happens when 
the objects used for comparison – the exemplars taken – have 
been selected to suit one’s case. Popper’s criterion of good 
scholarly work, namely falsifiability, is actually an instruction 
to search for exemplars that will not suit, but severely test 
one’s case (cf. Popper 1969:33ff). It is important to make our 
mistakes as fast as possible, for this is ‘experience’ – quoting 
Wilde and Wheeler to this effect (on the 5th title page). 
The term ‘value’ has its origin in economic thought: the 
valuation of a product in a situation of exchange. It is thus 
subjectivist in origin: how the seller assesses his or her 
product; how the buyer assesses the same product, and the 
final agreement found between the two subjects. The value 
will be expressed in numerical terms whether the exchange 
takes place in monetary terms or in terms of bartering 
products for products (cf. Venter 1994). 
In the environment of ideology the values would become the 
justifications of the means and will probably not be numerical. 
But cultural practice often provides the aims and the values: 
presently we are living in an economistic environment 
where comparisons tend to deliver economic values in terms 
of numbers. Why else do we currently have the tendency 
for numerical values to dominate or replace all other 
‘importants’? 
In comparing, one has to note especially critical differences or 
critical similarities. Points of comparison are usually not of equal 
importance. Present-day transdisciplinary methodologies 
may easily become reductionist since they may too easily 
be insensitive to critical differences. When one compares 
chemical reactions involving the same original elements, it 
makes for a critical difference whether the elements meet one 
another on top of a rock face or in a living organism. The 
very same elements combine in very peculiar ways within a 
biochemical context compared to an inorganic context. Fully 
materialist reductionists may attempt to reduce biochemical 
reactions to inorganic processes; bio-spiritualists may argue 
the other way round. In economics the components in an 
equation are often weighted before being included (or not), 
for example the Gross National Product equation (like horses 
carrying different ‘stone’ in handicapped races). 
Ideology often blinds the social and political scientist to such 
critical differences or similarities, or may shift the comparison to 
an alleged critical difference or similarity in the object itself. This is 
the reason why Marxists call capitalists ‘vulgar’ materialists 
– these latter are supposedly unable to see the critical difference 
that ‘life’ (as contradictory progressive power) makes to 
history. From the side of capitalism the response will be that 
individual ‘freedom’ is more critical to social wellfare and 
well-being than imposed ‘equality’.
All these are quite important in reading James’s table 
(see Table 1). The evaluative, judgemental character of the 
oppositions is suppressed in the table, but the discourse 
carries emotive suggestions: surely one would rather be 
counted amongst the tough-minded than amongst the tender? 
Even though the oppositions as given are quite prejudiced 
and inaccurate, we can leave the details aside in order to 
look at the broader tendencies and their historical roots. 
Feyerabend sustained the tensions by welcoming – with their 
personal temperaments – everybody into the fold. Jamesian 
Pragmatism attempted to solve the tension, very clearly 
defined in terms of an oppositional hierarchy, by pretending 
that Pragmatism was ‘only’ a method; not a doctrine. It is but 
the passage in a house where everybody can have his or her 
own room. 
Pragmatism is inside the table and yet not, since it sets itself 
up as mediator, very much like Modernity’s elitist ambiguity 
of being both inside history and in an Archimedean point 
above history. Unsurprisingly Pragmatism turns out to have 
all the characteristics of the tough-minded temperament; it 
is not only the passage but also occupies all the rooms on the 
right-hand side of the passage. Thus if one wants to enter 
a room on the left for some ‘tender-minded’ property, one 
has to go through the security system of the tough-minded 
(passage) and be cleansed of all that is ‘inefficient’ and 
‘ineffective’. Note, Pragmatism occupies the passage, thus 
ensuring it is the mediator, the reconciler between the rooms 
on the left and on the right; it actually is the mediator-for-
others and the mediator-for-itself. 
Methodological ‘purification’ is a kind of Modern Platonism 
developed by Bacon in the Renaissance, radicalised by 
Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant; and still present in a 
Rationalist format in Husserl. James continued the tradition 
not only from a Lockean perspective, but also from an 
Irrationalistic perspective. His methodological purification 
cleanses all of one’s religion, one’s principles and the 
avenues of ‘free will’ – it is a rite of passage into philosophical 
adulthood. 
James was still in the continuation of the emancipatory project 
of Modernity – old-fashioned but somewhat more abstract: 
what formerly had been the struggle between church and 
state here became a serious philosophical opposition. There 
was a shift from the institutional level (church – already 
disempowered) to the level of ideas. Ideas have legs but 
they need good methodical shoes to ensure that they do not 
drag their feet. Table 1 does in fact not allow any space for 
‘Christian’ ideas as such; Christianity is simply sublimated 
into the broad spectrum of ‘Rationalism’ (and as stated 
above, secularism was the overwhelmingly dominant 
approach in Rationalism). Religion had its place usually as 
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part of emotional pietism (allowing for exceptions such as 
Kant and Hegel).
In fact, the doctrine of a helpless and ineffective Christianity 
has utopian roots: one finds it in Hobbes but especially 
amongst 19th century utopians such as William Godwin, 
who strongly believed that the Christian idea of voluntary 
care had not been effective for 19 centuries; the only answer 
was imposition of sharing by the state. James was more of an 
individualist, but his colleagues such as Dewey (and later 
Rorty) were nearer to socialism.
When one approaches foundational issues, the philosopher 
has to take a stance and rational arguments for one’s beliefs 
are thinning out. James’s arguments sound like elitist 
impositions rather than being convincing (as we shall see 
later). Purification for the sake of tough-mindedness: is this 
not enforced scepticism or relativism? And is the purification 
itself then really only a form, a method; really no dogma at all? 
Formalistic ideological purification
We supposedly live in non-ideological times. But have we 
actually reached an era of non-ideology? 
Taking Goudzwaard’s (1981:ch. 1–2) conception of ideology 
a little bit further, one has to note that ideologies:
• are obsessed with results and outcomes, for they (supposedly) 
struggle for everybody’s cause 
• are produced in studies behind the desks of intellectual 
elites (and in this sense they are near family of the utopians)
• have difficulty in leaving the ‘other’s’ religion intact, for 
they want the ‘cause’ to over-rule all norms for means and ends; 
their cause mostly being of a naturalistic welfare nature 
• tend to polarise, setting up an image of the unbeliever in 
their cause as inimical, as an enemy of human welfare, 
freedom, equality, justice (mostly conceived of in’ 
naturalistic terms), which justifies a measure of coercion or 
force (or all too often mass violence).
Ex post facto it is not Feyerabend’s ‘anything goes’ attitude 
that won the day; it is the Neo-Pragmatist paradigm quarantine 
that has taken hold. ‘Success’ is measured by ‘excellence 
in’ … ‘Excellence’ is here all too often understood as quantity 
of output. 
In order to sustain the image of ‘quality’ in a situation of 
immense outputs and mass institutions, the very strict rules 
of method set by a paradigm are enforced. Assessing of articles 
and grading of student research assignments have become 
template application. Remain inside the paradigm and follow 
the form – a double group solipsism. This is Neo-Pragmatist 
methodological purification – academic activism, the sense 
of which remains unclear. Everybody pays lip service at the 
altar of academic freedom; the sacrificial lambs having been 
devoured by Pragmatism’s Hophnis and Phineases. 
Apparently, James’s supposed methodological purification 
has been victorious: 
• ‘no’ dogma, only method
• ‘no’ theoretical content, only instrumental content
• ‘no’ content, only formal procedure. 
But are we not in danger of an end-justifies-the-means position 
when enclosed in this kind of formalism? As ‘revolutionary 
anarchist’ Feyerabend warned: when ‘events, not necessarily 
arguments … cause us to adopt new standards’, those 
adhering to the status quo will be forced ‘to provide, not just 
counter-arguments, but also contrary causes’ and adding: 
‘Virtue without terror is ineffective, says Robespierre’ 
(Feyerabend 1975:25). Feyerabend – again overstating his 
case – yet struggled to make sense of the whole intellectual 
enterprise, setting output-criteria like, ‘progress’, ‘advance’, 
‘improvement’, ‘increasing knowledge’, ‘keeping culture in 
motion’, et cetera, which he then immediately tried to retract. 
The problem was that even though he opted for Dadaism – 
for a Dadaist would not hurt a fly, much less a human being 
(p. 21, footnote 11) – he knew quite well that B. Shaw wrote 
(Feyerabend 1975):
A generation that had the courage to get rid of God, to crush the 
state and the church, and to overthrow society and morality, still 
bowed before Science. And in Science, where freedom ought to 
reign, the order of the day was ‘belief in the authorities or off 
with your head. (p. 21, footnote 10) 
A Dadaist would not hurt a fly, but how many scientists are 
Dadaists? They may not be hurting any flies, yet may hurt 
many Dadaists! How many do believe in nothing at all, if 
not even Feyerabend could succeed in believing in nothing 
at all? Is Kuhn’s Pragmatistic paradigmatic solipsism that 
makes the scientist unaccountable beyond the circle of his 
paradigm friends (cf. Kuhn 1975:18–20) not an example of 
Shaw’s serious warning against scientism, howsoever we 
may distance ourselves from his style?
Feyerabend (1975:15) criticises the ‘deterioration of language 
that follows any increase of professionalism’. Kuhn defended 
exactly this esotericism of the ‘professional scientist’. 
Professional scholars surely, I believe, need technical language 
in order to stabilise their work. One should, however, reject 
the elitism implied in the esotericism that had its extremes in 
the attempts at imposing artificial scientific languages such 
as that of the Wiener Kreis (cf. Carnap 1932) and still makes 
it difficult to see the real sense of a scientist’s work. Whether 
one opts for a dialectically polar logic, a formalistic one, or 
an intuitionistic one – the remnants of initiation type training 
has outlived Pythagoras for 2000 years. James (and Marcuse) 
tried to bridge such gaps, but as elitists reaching out. 
Right now, the scientists and their technological associates 
are active political manipulators of government, for 
tendering and spending billions to have a telescope in the 
Karoo for scientists to see the first seconds of creation (as an 
astrophysicist claimed in a TV news bulletin), expressing a 
superstitious belief in science. Also for building a number of 
(‘very safe’) nuclear power stations, whilst a vast formerly 
fertile area on the Witwatersrand has already been polluted 
and made dangerous for human use by the uranium 
being mined together with gold. The mines have become 
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untouchable since the National Party government had, and 
the ANC still has, an interest in selling uranium. Dadaism is 
no match for a tough-minded methodology. 
Methods are plans and plans are aimed at specific outputs. 
Pragmatism is quite near capitalism, asking for naturalistic 
outputs; games more than bread. The outcomes are the most 
important content providers for any method; even for a 
Dadaist strategy. It is methodo-ideology, inimical especially to 
Christian religious norms. 
Religion versus science
James tackles his issue – apparently the reconciling of the 
tensions of Modern thought (cf. James 1913:13–14) – from the 
point of view of religion versus science. This is important, for it 
surely was not the only possible starting point that his own 
table of oppositions (cf. Table 1 above) suggested; that is if 
one did want to focus on oppositions. The critical difference 
between the tender-minded and the tough-minded proves to be 
religion versus empirical science. And of course Pragmatism 
is supposed to be the mediator – yet tough-minded. This 
suggests an ideological game: 
• He could have taken at least seven other direct oppositions 
as starting point: 1 vs a, 2 vs b, 3 vs c, 4 vs d, 6 vs f, 7 vs g, 8 
vs h. Yet his first approach is from the angle of an indirect 
opposition: 5 vs a (religion versus empiricism). 
• He could have used at least 63 other indirect oppositions, 
yet he begins with a specific ‘indirect’ one: religion versus 
empirical knowledge, without explaining his choice. 
Certain ‘oppositions’ have been ingrained into the Western 
way of looking at reality. This specific opposition has vaguely 
been present in Plato but became very acute during the tense 
years of Early Christianity. Feyerabend (1975) noted many of 
the deficiencies present in the mind of James, as seen in the 
following quote of James (1913): 
Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist proclivity 
in existence as there are at the present day. Our children, one 
may say, are almost born scientific. But our esteem for facts has 
not neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious. 
Our scientific temper is devout. Now take a man of this type, 
and let him be also a philosophic amateur, unwilling to mix 
hodge-podge system after the fashion of a common layman, 
and what does he find his situation to be in this blessed year 
of our Lord 1906? He wants facts; he wants science, but he also 
wants religion. And being an amateur and not an independent 
originator in philosophy he naturally looks for guidance to 
experts and professionals whom he finds already in the field. A 
very large number of you here present … are amateurs of just 
this sort. (pp. 14–15)
Modernity had inherited this acute contrast between the 
empirical and the religious from the late Middle Ages 
(Duns Scotus, Ockham) and the Renaissance (Bacon). It 
became more prominent in the 17th century with science 
taking the lead and shifting religion to the margins (the 
subrational sentiments and emotions). ‘Reason’ sided with 
the state against faith and the church. It was Kant and Hegel 
who ‘saved’ religion by making it part of rationality, yet in 
doing so actualised a dialectical unity of the two under the 
leadership of reason. This Modern secular understanding 
of religion was adopted by many Christians, intimidated by 
accusations of being ‘emotional’ and ‘unscientific’. 
With the advent of Irrationalism in the 19th century 
(Pragmatism, Heroic Vitalism, Nietzschean Vitalism, 
and Existentialism), the compromise became a burden 
(for Christianity), for now religion could be accused of 
‘rationalism’, ‘principled dogmatism’ et cetera. This is exactly 
what James does in the table of characteristics (Table 1) and it 
makes the shift to Irrationalism religiously the best one. 
Rationalism versus Irrationalism
How did Irrationalism make its appearance? The problem lay 
in the lack of nuance in Modernity’s ontological distinctions. It 
proposed one basic distinction between ‘reason’ (a vague and 
encompassing idea) and ‘nature’ (reduced to the mechanical 
or the bio-mechanical). A table of the subcategories can help 
us to develop a brief explanation of the advent of irrationalism 
(see Table 2).
Not everybody accepted every subcategory in column A or B 
– different reductionisms occurred regarding both columns. 
The table categorises the widest spectrum available. In 
column B the order could be changed: some authors would 
put 3 in the place of 1, and shift 2 to 3.
Note the elevated position of the rational sphere: this expresses 
the ontology of rational human mastery and appropriation. 
Descartes characterised humankind as masters and owners 
of nature through science and technology (cf. Descartes 
1982:VI). Table 2 shows that, compared to a representative 
Scholastic philosopher such as Thomas Aquinas, the idea 
of ‘nature’ has been shrunk; in Thomas it included ‘reason’. 
In its Modern elevation reason displaced the Medieval 
supernatural (encompassing faith, grace, church and God). 
Since its inception Modernity propagated rational control 
for the sake of human advantage; in fact the 18th century 
econo-philosopher, Quesnay, defined morally good action as 
taking advantage through natural science and technology (cf. 
Venter 2012b:ch. 4.6, A.2). 
Hobbes (following Machiavelli) created a ghost that would 
forever haunt Modernity. He argued that the majority live 
as mechanical wolves in a perpetual instinctive conflict for 
power, honour and wealth. It surely is a category mistake 





1 - Reason (ideal)
2 - Understanding (logical)
3 - Intuition (synthesising) 
4 Sentiments (taste) -
5 Passions and drives (instinctual) -
6 Senses -
7 Biosphere (physiology) -
8 Inorganic -
†, Represents the subcategories subrational, natural, individual (part) and brutish.
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or an anomaly, for brute animals do not strive for honour 
and wealth. Modernity had already adopted the principle 
that humankind has natural roots and a supernatural aim. In 
Hobbes the roots became a shadowy threat to the survival of 
both individual and species. 
Hobbes’s own alternative was to follow reason; that is: to be 
obedient to the state as reason, to protect wolf against wolf 
and against power hungry institutions (especially the church 
hierarchy). As stable alternatives the natural condition versus 
the totalitarian state were not at ease with one another, 
but quite in line with the basic framework of the Modern 
ontology. The answer to such dilemmatic embarrassment lay 
in the adding of an article to the Modern confession: reality-
as-human is historical and follows a line of inevitable progress 
(cf. Venter 1999:18–46).
Columns A and B in Table 2 are then not oppositional 
alternatives to be kept in balance from side B, but are phases of 
progress from A to B. The plebs in Hobbes have a momentous 
rationality; in their quiet moments they may rationally 
think about justice and fairness to others; but normally the 
struggle for power, honour and wealth, and for bare survival 
over against the more powerful, is the order of the day. This 
struggle is guided by their natural inclinations, as indicated 
in column A (see Table 2). 
This naturalistic side of Hobbes became the supposed original 
state, the mentioned shadow following reason as it matures. 
One finds it in Rousseau, Turgot, Adam Smith, Kant, Hegel. 
It is the beginning of Turgot’s base-superstructure model, 
later adopted and adapted by Marxism. One can illustrate 
the faith in progress using a graph-like table. 
The horizontal axis of Table 3 (1–7) indicates the direction 
and development of reality as history. The vertical axis (A–
H), read column-wise, shows the decline of the influence of 
‘nature’ and the increasing influence of ‘reason’. Note that 
this is the history of a humanised reality; it is still pre-Darwin. 
Kant, who clearly accepted the rootedness of the human being 
in subhuman brutish mechanical animality (Mutmasslicher 
Anfang der Menschengeschichte; Kant 1975c), does present 
progress as in Table 3 – that is assuming the presence of a 
minimal, slumbering rationality in the first ‘human’ beings. In 
the Enlightenment representation of this history, subrational 
nature remains with us, howsoever rational we may become. 
Combining Table 2 and Table 3, one has to say that in Table 
3 block A1, very little of the rational aspects are in control 
– in Kant it is by and large only the cooperation of rational 
choice with the instinctive search for the right food and the 
sexual urge. Block H7 shows nature still present, though 
under pressure, but all the aspects of nature noted in Table 2 
column A, are still present; this is the Achilles heel of Modern 
Rationalism. 
Assuming that Table 3 column 7 could become a reality in 
all human beings (and that it had become a reality at least 
in those who were able to present us with this overview of 
all history), some very serious problems remained unsolved: 
1. How to account for the different supernatural entities taken 
into account by the Scholastics and displaced by ‘reason’ in 
Modernity:
1.1 God? Is He: Non-existent: Part of nature? In reason? On 
eternal leave?
1.2 Revelation? To be found in: Instinct? Reason? Or is it nothing 
but myth or projection? 
1.3 Faith? An act which is: an Emotion? Rational behaviour? 
Superstitious? 
1.4 Grace: given by: the State as kingdom of God? The General 
Will? 
1.5 Organised religion: institutionalised by: A free church? A State 
supervised church? 
2. Other aspects deemed important, not so easily given a place:
2.1 Morality: A long-term instinct? An emotion? A sentiment? A 
rational act? 
2.2 Art: Instinctual? Rational? 
2.3 Practical life: Pure Passion? Quite Rational? 
2.4 What does ‘rationality’ actually mean? [I (JJV) have have 
found about nine different answers.] 
3. A very serious issue would exactly be the relationship 
between reason-as-lord and nature-as-slave in terms of Table 
3 column 7. The majority of humankind would in Table 3 be 
somewhere between columns 1 and 3. 
3.1 Who are to control the majority – the column 6’s and 7’s? 
3.2 Who are the column 6’s and 7’s? The Scientists? Technocrats? 
La raison de l’état [reason of state]? 
3.3 How do we know that the column 6’s and 7’s will not act 
according to Table 2 column A – their natural inclinations to care 
for themselves and instrumentalise others? Who will control the 
self-appointed intellectual masters? (cf. Kant 1975b)
The different possible answers to these questions each found 
a defender. Regarding questions 1 and 2: in all too many 
cases nature became the location and reason (at least in spe 
[in hope]) the master and owner. In all of Modernity the civil 
TABLE 3: Faith in progress.
Nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason
B Nature Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason
C Nature Nature Reason Reason Reason Reason Reason
D Nature Nature Nature Reason Reason Reason Reason
E Nature Nature Nature Nature Reason Reason Reason
F Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature Reason Reason
G Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature Reason
H Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature Nature
The horizontal axis of the table is represented by the numbers 1–7 and indicates the direction and development of reality as history, whilst A–H represents the vertical axis. Read column-wise it 
shows the decline of the influence of ‘nature’ and the increasing influence of ‘reason’.
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state represented divine rationality; the head of state thus 
enjoying divine rights. 
The really problematic issues then were those under question 
3. Humankind’s rootedness in nature implied carrying its 
‘natural’ aspects permanently with it. The issue of external 
versus internal control of human individuals was dangerously 
serious. Descartes as monistic interactionist believed that 
the mechanical could be the causal media of wisdom from 
one rational subject to another – two purified reasons much 
too needful of greasy machines. Hobbes chose for external 
controls and Kant, having seen some results of this, just threw 
his intellectual hands in the air in the face of ‘radical evil’. 
Hobbes (1946) put it thus: 
The value, or WORTH of a man, is of all other things, his price; 
that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his 
power: therefore it is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the 
need and judgment of another ... And as in other things, so in 
men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the price. … The 
public worth of a man, which is the value set on him by the 
commonwealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. 
And this value of him by the commonwealth is understood [to 
be] by offices of command, judicature, public employment; or by 
names and titles, introduced for distinctions of such value. For 
he is the worthiest to be a commander …that is best fitted, with 
the qualities required to the well discharging of it; and worthiest 
of riches, that has the qualities most requisite for well using of 
them: any of the qualities being absent, one may nevertheless be 
a worthy man, and valuable for something else. Again a man may 
be worthy of riches, office, and employment, that nevertheless, 
can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot 
be said to merit or deserve it. For merit presupposeth a right, and 
that the thing deserved is due by promise … (Leviathan X)
Hobbes (1946) wanted us to believe that:
• the worth of a person is his or her interindividual utility, as 
judged by the powerful (the demander) 
• the dignity of a person is his or her public utility, as assessed 
by state authorities.
Two requirements for realising such worthiness or 
dignification are: 
1. fitness for the job 
2. a pre-existing contract. 
But in Hobbes’s format, this implies that one human is but a 
tool for another and all citizens are tools of the state.
Locke (n.d.; TTG, II: 1–10), through his Christian doctrine 
of the inherent worthiness and thus inalienable rights 
of humankind and Kant by elevating human reason 
to the supernatural position, resisted this utilitarian 
instrumentalising of fellow human beings. It had, however, 
already been institutionalised in transitional patterns 
from late feudalism to early capitalism: the international 
slave trade, exploitative colonialism, exploitation of rural 
husbandry as well as workers, as the industrial revolution 
gained momentum. The natural, instinctive care for self-
interest (rational control limited to the momentary actions of 
the ‘impartial spectator’) became the struggle for survival in 
Darwin and the formalised calculus of pleasure in Bentham 
(moral philosopher) and the war [sic] to secure it, in his 
student, Edgeworth (economist). 
On the collective side the Hobbesian principle that only 
the leadership of the collective acts rationally was realised 
widely by self-appointed intellectual or scientific leaders 
in different forms of nationalism and socialism: the plebs 
had to be forced to obey the general will and thus be free (cf. 
Rousseau 1916:II, vii). Hobbes’s promise of protection by civil 
society, the French revolutionary Condorcet’s eschatology 
of a scientifically morally purified and happy humankind, 
Kant’s promise of perpetual rational peace through a balance 
of instinctively selfish warring state authorities – all these 
collapsed in the face of the self-advantaging powerful seeking 
own utility. Human-beings-in-spe [hoping to be] had but 
instrumental worthiness for the self-appointed, ‘peaceful’, 
rational masters. 
Pragmatistic scientism versus Christianity
During the second half of the 19th century the Christian love-
hope-faith trinity had been fully displaced, but intellectuals 
began to realise that the hope in, and for, reason was 
futile. Amongst irrationalists a singular, lonely intellectual, 
Kierkegaard, tried to revive some of the Christian hope2. For 
the rest the compacted nature of Table 3, H7, unfolded into 
power again, and we see Table 2, column A – brutish nature 
– return as different currents:
• romanticism chose for the dominance of sentiments and 
passions 
• realism for sense experience 
• naturalism for the survival war for basic physiological and 
instinctive needs
• existentialism for the jump into a dark future to become 
human
• heroic vitalism for an individual, violent above-human or 
super-collective 
• later positivism for a logic with unstable axioms and rules.
And then there was Pragmatism, pretending to embody 
all these other currents – yet the focus was on outcomes 
and output; an Irrationalist utilitarianism3. But it was also a 
2.I am thinking here of irrationalist philosophers taken into account in secular 
textbooks. Depending on the extension of the circumscription of ‘Christian’, one 
could of course take thinkers such as the earlier Dilthey and also Schleiermacher 
into account – even though strongly subjectivistic and rationalistic. In James’s day 
even Hegel’s philosophy was considered ‘Christian,’ otherwise a dialectical theology 
could never have found the acceptance it did. If one is stricter in circumscription, 
then of course those thinkers not often found in secular textbooks come to mind: 
in Reformed circles Groen van Prinsterer, Abraham Kuyper and possibly Bavinck; 
in Catholic circles probably the early Husserl (who considered himself Christian), 
Blondel and Neo-Thomism amongst others.   
3.Utilitarianism is a moral philosophy teaching that moral behaviour is that behaviour 
which increases utility. In too many cases ‘utility’ has been equated with increased 
pleasure and decreased pain – that is ‘hedonism’. It has always been difficult to 
determine whose utility has to be increased: liberal individualists argued that if 
the individual can take care of increasing my own interests, then utility is increased 
for everybody. More socially consciousness utilitarians would rather argue that 
everyone should work for the greatest utility for the greatest number. Utilitarianism 
as such could fit in with different philosophical attitudes, such as both rationalism 
and irrationalism. Under rationalism it would argue that one should overcome 
egoism and strive for rational reflection on what is good for me, or what is good for 
all – universally. When rationalism was no more fashionable, utilitarianism adopted 
an irrationalistic heart, called ‘pragmatism’. Pragmatism is in fact utilitarianism gone 
mad. One does no more need to have rational arguments for one’s behaviour. A 
liberal pragmatist would argue: this is ethical, since it works for me. A more socially 
consciousness pragmatist would be one testing what works for the majority. The 
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return to ‘nature’ of a special kind: the natural sub-rational 
Hobbesian mind. It was the extension of Scientism in its 
empiricist form; the belief that science was the best approach 
for the realisation of the Modern agenda. 
In the earlier quote from James (1913) he admits to that 
which has been characteristic of Modernity at least since 
Descartes; a religious adoration of science and its power, being 
an ontology of mastery and appropriation in which technical 
methods have the upper hand (cf. Venter 2012a:ch. 5, J2). 
This is important: where science and religion are opposed, 
or state and church, the confrontation eventually shows itself 
as one between two religions: one transcendentally and the other 
immanently rooted. 
The ‘new’ ‘religion’ will – especially when it is science or 
ideology (the latter mostly an extension of the former) – set 
itself up as elite, as better, the replacement of the aged, as the 
gracious one. James presents science as pervasive: every child 
who loves ‘empirical’ knowledge, ‘facts’, is a born ‘scientist’. 
How to reconcile this with the apparently opposite striving 
for ‘religion’ is a question which the elite professional 
Pragmatist philosopher has to answer for you. What answer 
does the Pragmatist give regarding Christianity?
The Christianity of his days – James (1913:22ff) paints with a 
broad brush – are of two tender-minded types: the Hegelian 
pantheist Protestants and the Roman Catholic reserved 
theists – the one as abstract as the other. 
A broad brush, very broad indeed; dripping with dark paint. 
The dice was loaded to one side: being-crucified upside 
down, fed to the lions, burnt at the stake, decapitated, jailed 
for not signing a revolutionary ‘confession’, going to far-off 
countries and face disease and death to be among the poor, 
suffering injustice to be a voice for others, being denied access 
to public facilities, emancipating the lowest casts – nothing of 
these could be presented as down-to-earth, factual, empirical 
tough-mindedness? 
The fact that some liberal theologians adopt new intellectual 
fashions is surely no proof that the majority of Christians 
follow them? Theology is theory; religion is praxis; and often the 
cleft between the two becomes quite wide. But James (1913) 
knows what is really needed: 
What you want is a philosophy that will not only exercise your 
powers of intellectual abstraction but that will make some 
positive connection with this actual world of finite human lives. 
You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific 
loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the 
spirit of adaptation and accommodation, in short, but also the 
old confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, 
whether of the religious or of the romantic type. And this is 
then your dilemma: you find the two parts of your quaesitum 
hopelessly separated. You find empiricism with inhumanism 
and irreligion; or else you find a rationalistic philosophy that 
indeed may call itself religious, but that keeps out of all definite 
touch with concrete facts and joys and sorrows. (p. 20)
James (1913:28ff) opposes ‘intellectual’ ideas. But 
surreptitiously he admits to dogma: empiricism combined 
with ‘inhumanism’ is apparently ‘wrong’. There is a dogmatic 
norm here: one has to be both empiricist and humanist. ‘What 
you want …’. James wants us to have ‘spirit’ and ‘matter’. 
Christianity fails, being a spiritualistic ‘nothing-but’-ter. 
Religion has had its time, says the materialist. Christ has in 
two thousand years done nothing for humankind.
Ideology
William James knows what is good for the new generation. 
So did Marx. So did Comte. So did Hobbes. Worldviewish 
prescriptive intellectual elitism – knowing everybody’s good 
cause better than they do themselves – is one of the most 
prominent characteristics of ideology, especially where 
outcomes are prescribed whilst one keeps quiet about the means 
issue. Pragmatism measures effects, outputs and outcomes. 
Causes, instruments, means, and meanings can be given any 
sense only in terms of their effects James (1913): 
It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes 
collapse into insignificance the moment you subject them 
to this simple test of tracing a consequence. There can be no 
difference anywhere that doesn’t make a difference elsewhere 
– no difference in abstract truth that doesn’t express itself in 
a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon 
that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhere, and 
somewhen. The whole function of philosophy ought to be to 
find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at 
definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-
formula be the true one. … Pragmatism represents a perfectly 
familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it 
represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less 
objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist 
… turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed 
systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and 
towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and 
the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means open air and 
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality, and the 
pretence of finality in truth. At the same time it does not stand 
for any special results. It is a method only. (p. 51)
This quote contains in a nutshell what mature Pragmatism is 
all about. The characteristics of so-called ‘Post-Modernism’ 
are clearly present:
• Intellectual elitism of an ideological kind: every abstract 
truth must and will make an empirical difference. Note 
that ‘Pragmatism’ does not mean having and applying practical 
experience; it rather means making the empirical world fit one’s 
subjective intentions. It kept the backbone of the Modern 
ontology of mastery and appropriation. 
• No fixed principles, no closed systems, no absolutes and no 
origins. ‘Post-Modernism’ has taken its cue from this. There 
is nothing to hold onto; only an endless muddy pool and 
we have to muddle through. This is why James, in spite 
of his self-confidential approach, talks of the Pragmatist 
mind as ‘pessimist’. It is like the joke of the mouse fallen 
into a huge drum of milk, having to water-tread until the 
milk becomes cream, then until the cream becomes butter, 
using the butter as boat to reach the side – very, very, very 
far away … And yet, the form does count.
• It is situationistic and eventualistic – prefiguring Foucault’s 
fighting each power event on its own. In James it meant 
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bringing ‘out of each word its practical cash value’ and 
‘set it at work within the stream of your experience’ (James 
1913:53). It is focused on the here and now, apparently the 
short term; Heidegger’s staying-where-you-already-are 
demythologised into empirical results. Within this muddy 
pool one has to water-tread, looking for that clod of mud 
to take a little ride on; coming from no beginning and not 
going anywhere in particular; getting one step ‘ahead’ 
each time. One has to ask Nietzsche’s Zarathustra where 
‘ahead’ is. It suddenly becomes clear that Feyerabend’s 
revolutionary scientific anarchism or Dadaism was not so 
very new, though he surely had gone further down the 
road. 
• It is individualistic and even fragmentary. ‘Post-Modern’ 
relativistic authors assume endless networks, but are 
mostly focused on recovering the individual, the fragment, 
from the network of processes and events. Rationalism 
insisted that the mind creates universal objects within in 
its own orbit and that the empirical world – often itself 
seen as but a mental construct – was subject to these 
universals as law. James rejects ‘bad’ a priori reasons; but 
does this imply that there are good ones, and what would they 
look like? Given some hidden naturalistic and animalistic 
views of being human, Hume’s issues around induction 
remained a problem: how come the day-old chicken 
‘understands’ three dimensional space in a way that 
took geniuses in geometry centuries to discover? In a 
naturalistic evolutionary context the a priori first became 
rooted in the sub-rational passions and instincts in Turgot 
and later (after Darwin) completely absorbed into them, in 
Freud and clearly in Pragmatism’s other grandfather, C.S. 
Peirce (cf. Peirce 1878).
• And yet it is scholarly worldviewish, analysing 
worldviews on the basis of their practical effects. What 
practical, observable effects will make Pragmatism itself 
true? How does a method without any normative doctrine 
choose among effects that make it better than for example 
Rationalism or Christianity? 
• The framework of Pragmatism is subjective idea as instrument 
in an individual mind – whether instinctive or abstract – and its 
empirical effects.
Presently we do find a kind of social brutalising in a wide-
ranging hedonism, exploitation of human beings for pure 
material accumulation, a ‘civilised’ (that is: a technically 
sophisticated and thus civilly acceptable) disrespect for 
human life (whether medical or military), all pervading 
consumerism and skin-deep beautification with no regard to 
consequences for personal or environmental health. 
A professed non-doctrine pretending to be pure method is 
an attempt to play with means via ends, having no criteria 
for the goodness of either. Is there a link between present 
lifestyles and a dominant Pragmatism? 
Pragmatism as a worldview and a philosophy
The quote of James (1913:51; see the previous section on 
‘Ideology’) may help us further: Pragmatism really does 
not stand for pure method and no doctrine – it ‘acts’ the 
opposite of what it preaches. Philosophy has to analyse 
worldviews (‘world-formulas’ James calls them), asking the 
simple question: If worldview A is true, what, empirically 
observable difference would it make to processes, events 
and human actions? And if worldview B were to be true? 
Pragmatism, James suggests, is but a formal philosophy – it is 
only a method to choose between ideas and doctrines. It does 
not have its own principles or absolutes:
• ‘Only a method’? But doesn’t the requirement of having 
a method already constitute some norm, or principle, or 
doctrine?
• A method without a content? Doesn’t the instruction to 
evaluate doctrines on the basis of their difference in 
practical effects constitute a content and a normative one 
at that? 
• And crucially: How to evaluate the different effects? 
Where do I find the criteria to assess Buddhism versus 
Christianity – is it an issue of conforming to the effects 
which I – evaluator – believe a good worldview should 
deliver? Or in terms of the efficiency of each to deliver on 
its own promises? If the latter, how then to say which is 
the most efficient? Are the contents of efficiency in the two 
cases comparable? And if they are about equally efficient 
in delivering on their own aims, then what? Or so what? 
The Pragmatist turns to concreteness, adequacy, action 
and power – quite reminiscent of Machiavelli, the French 
Revolution, Nietzsche and Marx. In intellectual history one 
of the recurring attitudes is to overstate one’s own case 
and understate the other’s, in order to differentiate one’s 
own views from what had gone before. James repeatedly 
states that Pragmatism is nothing new; it is in fact the oldest 
philosophy in existence. But of course: it is new in the sense 
of a critique of the recent past’s ineffective philosophies; it is thus 
better:
• Yet when one reads him carefully, he does not seem to 
have studied Kant or Hegel intensively, observing the 
real consequences of their work. For all their cloud-thin 
abstractions, the practical difference their philosophies 
could and have made was clear: Kant propagated a league 
of nations – adopted by Catherine the Great and her 
successors on the Russian throne – and became the great 
granddad of the 20th century United Nations. Hegel was 
the grandfather of Marxism, Stalinism and radical right 
wing political practices (such as Fascism’s systematic 
framework for the reception of for example Sorel, as 
executed by Gentile). 
• He also did not study Descartes very well, who, for all his 
aprioristic deductivistic Rationalism, still was the father of 
technicistic power mongering in terms of the ontology of 
mastery and appropriation.
• When one talks of proposing a philosophy of concreteness, 
adequacy, action and power – all the questions posed above 
return in another form: How to know how much concreteness 
makes for adequacy? What direction is our action to take? What 
kind of power and how much of it? 
James’s selection of outcomes clearly shows that Pragmatism 
is not merely formal. If one does have any further selection 
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criteria, these will fill some books. And if one does not have 
any criteria, will intellectual life – in its required consequences 
– then not simply become the brutality of what I personally 
like to happen, here, now? 
Pragmatism stands quite close to the later Auguste Comte’s 
form of Positivism. Since Descartes Modernity had been 
propagating the idea that if one wanted to be scientific, one 
had to find inevitable natural laws. If one wanted to control one 
had to know such laws. In Kant even history is reduced to 
a natural science for the sake of ‘being-scientific’ (cf. Kant 
1975a:33–34). But his striving for world peace and governance 
depended completely on his understanding of such laws; the 
prophet of autonomous freedom surreptitiously required 
control over humankind. Comte (1957:178–179), however, 
argued that we are searching for but an approximation of such 
laws for the sake of mastery and control, a scientific economising 
for human advantage. He argued in this way, in order to 
convert the one-eyed specialist and the competitive egoist 
into a servant of his divinity: Humanity. 
A senior Neo-Marxist, Horkheimer (1953), would plead with 
first year students in Frankfurt always to look beyond their 
discipline and be sensitive for the suffering of humankind. 
By then the mastery and appropriation motive had taken 
its utmost toll – Comte and Nietzsche’s above-humans had 
brought the utmost suffering. During Modernity the idea 
of evil (conflict, competition) being good or serving the 
good, progressively transformed itself into a philosophical 
anthropology of essential mastery-in-unity-with-essential-
suffering. Given the agenda of Modernity, human suffering 
as essence had to be eliminated by progress to a higher 
essence; but the 20th century showed the opposite. 
During the 20th century (especially after Rorty) a heavy 
cloud of doubt about the representation, the ‘realism’ of our 
pictures of the world, cast a shadow over traditional Modern 
epistemology. The 20th century sceptics about representation 
have been a few centuries late: Kant’s struggle with the 
Ding-an-sich [thing-in-itself] had already indicated such 
doubt. However, as subjectivism grew – Nietzsche and the 
later Comte being cases in point – activism and power came to 
overshadow exactitude. Feyerabend noticed this. James (1913) 
summarised it thus: 
When the first mathematical, logical, and natural uniformities, 
the first laws, were discovered, men were so carried away by 
the clearness, the beauty and simplification that resulted, that 
they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically the 
eternal thoughts of the Almighty. His mind thundered and 
reverberated in syllogisms … He thought the archetypes of all 
things, and devised their variations; and when we rediscover 
any one of these his wondrous institutions, we seize his mind in 
a very literal sense. But as the sciences have developed farther, 
the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all of our 
laws are only approximations. The laws themselves, moreover, 
have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and 
so many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches 
of science that investigators have become accustomed to the 
notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but 
that any one of them may at some point be useful. Their great 
use is to summarise old facts and to lead to new ones. They 
are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand … in 
which we write our reports of nature; and languages, as is well 
known, tolerate much choice of expression and many dialects. 
(pp. 56–57)
The value of theory, even a mathematical theory, like that 
of any idea whatsoever, does not lie in precision, truth, 
exactitude, but only in its effects as a tool for power. The cash 
value idea of theory instrumentalises ideas. ‘Theories thus 
become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest’ 
(James 1913:53). Instruments, then, in terms of concretisation, 
adequation, activism and empowering. Of what and of 
whom? 
Will not the adherents of an idea then also become useful 
tools for the already powerful? Machiavelli, copying Ancient 
Roman totalitarianism, presented religion as useful opium 
for the people – to keep them subdued; one has but to get 
some control over the pope or the religious leaders. He 
was copied by Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx. All ideologies 
instrumentalise ideas for the ‘good of everybody’, and the 
‘good for everybody’ is shown in the practice of the elites’ 
beliefs (Mao 1968): 
The Marxist dialectical philosophy … emphasizes the 
dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory is 
based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any 
knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, 
but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can 
be the criterion of truth. (p. 4) 
Social praxis as the singular criterion of truth? How short 
the intellectual distance between James and Mao? James, in 
summarising the characteristics of Pragmatism, offers us the 
form of an authoritarian ideology, which allows for any means-
serve-ends manipulations and brutalities, to set itself as the 
‘only’ idea that really ‘works’. Present-day managerialism is 
but one form of Pragmatism (authoritarianism, sometimes 
with a smile). The Pragmatist may then exactly do with 
religion what Machiavelli propagated: use it as an opiate for 
the people. 
My interpretation is not far removed from that of Groothuis 
(2013), who refers to Russell’s criticism that God in James 
becomes no more than a ‘useful’ hypothesis. This apart from 
the fact that already since Lovejoy’s 1908 criticism of James 
there has been a whole debate about what James could have 
had in mind by ’meaning’ as ‘the effects of an idea’ and truth 
as the ‘useful effects’ – all ambiguities that one may follow 
up in Rydenfelt (2008), which make it difficult to apply the 
theory.
 
James, science and religion
James started his series of lectures from the perspective of the 
opposition between religion and empirical science. Einstein, 
writing at more or less the same time and already strongly 
influenced by Pragmatism, still adhered to the idea that one 
could finally solve the puzzle of reality in all its forms and 
find God’s thoughts (cf. Venter, 2012c:41ff). James has moved 
much further into Irrationalism than Peirce and Einstein; the 
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types or religious thinking which other Irrationalists still 
accepted, he now rejected as tender-minded Rationalism. 
Like Machiavelli much earlier, James pretended not to have 
a problem with religion as such, but with the Rationalist, 
tender-minded, abstract religion of his time. He quotes from 
Morrison H. Swift’s Human submission (1905), the case of a 
worker in Cleveland who killed his children and himself in 
desperation after losing his job (James 1913):
This … is one of the elemental stupendous facts of this modern 
world and of this universe. It cannot be glozed over or minimized 
away by all the treatises on God, and love, and being, helplessly 
existing in their monumental vacuity. This is one of the simple 
irreducible elements of this world’s life, after millions of years 
of opportunity and twenty centuries of Christ. It is in the mental 
world what atoms and sub-atoms are in the physical, primary, 
indestructible. And what it blazons to man is the imposture of all 
philosophy which does not see in such events the consummate 
factor of all conscious experience. These facts invincibly prove 
religion a nullity. Man will not give religion two thousand 
centuries or twenty centuries more to try itself and waste human 
time. Its time is up; its probation has ended; its own record ends 
it. (p. 31)  
James uses this to attack ‘rationalism’ as an attitude from the 
empiricist position. Discursively speaking, both James and 
Swift totally confused rationalist theology with religion itself. The 
case of the worker here cited surely is of serious concern. 
However, when one reads Western economic documents 
from the 16th century onwards, secular capitalistic thinking 
contributed to the enculturation of the ontology of mastery 
and appropriation. Some sections of different Christian 
denominations cooperated with the powers that be, but at 
least in South African history, missionaries were often quite 
unpopular with the establishment, for taking the sides of 
the indigenous people. Wherever the Christian missionaries 
had gone, real emancipation of ordinary people took place. 
Traditional social formations have been and still are quite 
authoritarian and holistic; individuality suffers (cf. further 
Choi 2000:ch. 6). James, however, like Swift (and the 19th 
century utopians such as William Godwin) believed that 
Christianity was ‘ineffective’. 
Again it is clear that James’s comparison was not evenhanded; 
his selection of oppositional points of comparison was quite 
arbitrary, and his selection of a critical difference was a 
twisted, uncritically accepted, traditional opposition. 
James’s empiricist measurement of Christianity implied yet 
another hidden normative perspective. When James said 
that every event made an empirical difference and that 
philosophy’s task was to differentiate between the empirical 
effects of different worldviews, he approached determinism. 
However, though evolutionist, he still harboured the 
Humanist striving for human and humane advantage. 
Making an empirical difference – effectiveness and efficiency 
– does not in itself tell us that this or that difference is a 
good or bad one. Concreteness, adequacy, action and power 
provide no direction in themselves and from themselves. 
In spite of his rejection of Rationalism and adoption of 
unprincipled Irrationalistic empiricism, he adhered to the 
norms of Humanism: welfare and wellbeing for all, as proposed by 
the theories of the elite. 
Christianity, to be acceptable, had to be purified into a 
‘humanism’ in which the effectiveness of means were to be 
justified by Humanistic efficiency in mastery and appropriation, 
especially in individual situations ‘on the ground’. However, 
coming from the tradition of scientism, situational efficiency 
is not enough. One had to get rid of tensions among one’s 
‘effective’ ideas, which means that there is no place for an 
inconsistent combination of Christianity with Pragmatism; 
one has to work for consistent effectiveness; immerse oneself 
completely into the ‘paradigm’.
Consistency
Finding an idea really efficient and effective, it had to 
be integrated with one’s existing ideas. The Comtean 
approximations of law might not ‘work’ anymore. Thomas 
Kuhn, in the Structure of scientific revolutions, understood 
the implications of this: clashes amongst one’s ideas will 
accumulate up to a heavily anomalous situation; finally 
a ‘scientific’ revolution takes place in which the latest 
successful idea has to make converts, leaving the previous 
world-formula as a whole behind (cf. Kuhn 1975:ch. 2–4). 
James’s pretence that one could be a Christian and a Pragmatist 
could be tested by his theory of integration in order to obtain 
consistency. Once a theory or a worldview apparently does 
not produce the required Humanistic results, a new, efficient 
and effective idea has to be inserted into one’s conceptual 
network. If the new idea really is efficient and effective, then 
surely the whole body of inherited ideas will have to make 
way or be changed fundamentally for the sake of consistency. 
Kuhn, rooted in Pragmatism, lost track of continuity in the 
history of science. His Pragmatist search for a consistent 
network of successful ideas forced him in a direction where 
continuity became invisible, even where explicitly sustained 
(Einstein denied having been a revolutionary). 
Thus James’s vision might make Christianity a more efficient 
‘Humanism’, but would it still be recognisable as ‘Christian’? 
An effective, relative Absolute, in so far forth …
James clouded his own understanding of Christianity (or 
for that matter of religion) in using his own Pragmatist 
semantics to interpret what ‘religion’ and ‘god’ is all about. In 
his attempt to bring the heavens down to earth, he interprets 
hedonistic comforting as the practical cash-value of the 
‘Absolute’. Like Marx, James (1913) was turning Hegel on his 
head – but is this an explanation of Christianity?:
Now pragmatism, devoted though she be to facts, has no 
such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under. 
More-over, she has no objection whatever to the realising of 
abstractions, so long as you get about among particulars with 
their aid and they actually carry you somewhere. Interested in 
no conclusions but those which our minds and our experiences 
work out together, she has no a priori prejudices against 
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theology. If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, 
they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so 
much. For how much more are true, will depend entirely on their 
relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged. As a 
good Pragmatist, I myself ought to call the Absolute true ‘in so 
far forth’ … But what does true in so far forth mean in this case? 
To answer, we need only apply the pragmatic method. What do 
believers in the absolute mean by saying that their belief affords 
them comfort? They mean that since, in the Absolute finite evil 
is ‘over-ruled’ already, we may, therefore, whenever we wish, 
treat the temporal as if it were potentially the eternal, be sure that 
we can trust its outcome, and, without sin, dismiss our fear and 
drop the worry of our finite responsibility. In short, they may 
mean that we have a right ever and anon to take a moral holiday, 
to let the world wag in its own way, feeling that its issues are in 
better hands than ours and are none of our business.… that is his 
cash-value when he is pragmatically interpreted. If the Absolute 
means this, and means no more than this, who can possibly deny 
the truth of it? To deny it would be to insist that men should 
never relax, and that holidays are never in order. (pp. 73–75)
This sounds much like Sartre a little later, complaining that 
Christians do not really take responsibility for the world they 
are creating (Sartre 1970:1–10). Rooted in an idea of truth that 
says whatever is good for me is true (cf. James 1913:75–76), 
one cannot but wonder how James’s idea of goodness can be 
reconciled with a Christian idea of such. 
Note that James uses the term ‘absolute’ and not ‘Christ’ 
or ‘God’, submerging concrete Christianity into a Hegelian 
theological ‘Absolute’. He also quietly shifted his terminology: 
‘theological ideas’ (not ‘religion’) is now his term. Now 
since he does not distinguish here between theology as an 
intellectual discipline and religion as a practice, ‘theological 
ideas’ is used as a totalitarian blanket cover for ideas 
inherent in religious practice, yet not present in the Hegelian 
philosophical theology that his critical discourse targets 
here. In this context, his presentation of religion is a fargoing 
misrepresentation. 
Religious truth and the belief in God
What James finds true in religion is that which have an experiential 
effect on its adherents. This, according to himself, is limited to 
comfort and relaxation. What about consistency now? James 
indicated a tension between the belief in an Absolute and his 
Pragmatist belief that there are no absolutes. Well, he says, I 
do not have to give up the cash-value of believing in moral 
holidays by relinquishing this whole metaphysical edifice of 
Absolutes. One can just find other arguments, more suitable 
to one’s other vital truths and continue on one’s way … 
James (1913) insists that Pragmatism does not deny the 
existence of God. It does, however, propagate a very 
particular kind of god (even though insisting on having no 
dogmas or prejudices): 
The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we are told he 
is, but whatever the God of earth of heaven is, he can surely 
be no gentleman. His menial services are needed in the dust of 
our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the 
empyrean. (p. 72) 
Having already presented this idea of God, he later states that 
Pragmatism, being unprejudiced, will accept both rationalist 
logic and sense experience, both mysticism and a God who 
lives in the very dirt of private fact (James 1913):
Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of 
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with 
the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted. 
If theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in 
particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly 
deny God’s existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 
‘not true’ a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What 
other kind of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement 
with concrete reality? (p. 73) 
In a quote above James tells us what kind of a philosophy 
we need as religious persons. He plays the irreligious, 
inhumanist empiricism of his times out against the religious, 
abstract intellectualism of the Rationalists. Table 1, compared 
directly with Table 2 and Table 3, gives us his prejudices and 
his rootedness in an older tradition. 
One of the most serious prejudices is the hierarchical, 
oppositional character in terms of which the relationships 
between column B (rational, civil) and A (the sub-rational) has 
been expressed. Once one sets foot into this opposition, you 
find yourself in an intellectual trap between Rationalism and 
Irrationalism. Modernity has by and large – but not always – 
relegated faith and religion to the sphere of sentiments and/
or emotions. Thus the only empirical cash value that James 
can find lies on the level of comfort. He then offers us a better 
deal: a God who is not a gentleman but crawls himself into 
the dirt of hard, factual life. This is the Pragmatist idea of 
God; if he is at work, then he surely exists. Or we have to 
bring him into existence. 
Remarkable. One wonders whether James did read the 
Bible. His picture of this god nears a man from Nazareth. 
Does not the Bible precisely teach a God who became human 
and slept out in the open with the poor? Who found his 
closest followers and future messengers amongst fishermen 
and rural people in the very outback of Palestine? Who 
emancipated women (some of suspicious morality) and also 
despised people (such as treasonous tax collectors)? Who 
showed solidarity with humankind right into death. And 
whose followers – sometimes quite negligent – still preach 
and practice much of what he taught. Not a God of dirty 
empirical, efficient practice, but of a life of utmost trial and 
suffering? 
When one sublimates the essential traits of a worldviewish 
tradition into some intellectual doctrine (such as a theology), 
then the judgemental comparison of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ 
becomes easy – but can such a comparison sustain assessment 
for being responsible scholarship?
Context
There is something interesting, though, in James’s attempts to 
remain a Humanist within the harshness of empiricism. Marx 
set the example. As was explained above, led by the ideal of 
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(natural scientific) certainty, Modernity gradually moved in 
the direction of a mechanistic naturalism, at least regarding 
the arché [the primal principle]. Near the beginning was the 
mechanical wolf. However, in the same vein it was argued 
that this machine wolf was able, exactly through means of 
natural law, to solve all of its own problems. For it was quite 
unlike the natural beings from which it originated – at least 
some human beings were such and in time the others could 
become so. 
Thence Modernity found itself in a very serious tension: 
how to show that the arrogant brute calling itself homo sapiens 
was not only sapiens but in fact at least homo. The recovering 
of Modernity’s lost human god reigns behind the pretence of 
a pliable, flexible, non-dogmatic, method. Why anyway be 
concerned with a brute animal that in the eyes of many was 
only a very complex machine – a brute that brutalises its own 
kind (for power, honour and wealth)? Some did answer: this 
one brutal machine could suffer and know its own suffering – 
this made it human. In managing our suffering rationally, we 
are ‘human’. 
The only way to really argue the case for humanness was to 
adopt dialectical logic – opposites come from opposites – as 
the dialectical materialists (Marxists) did; thus deriving the 
humane from the brute. Or: to change truth in such a way as to 
accommodate all pleasures. 
In both cases the means-ends relationship becomes amoral. 
What James expected from religious people is to care for their 
suffering without caring about the means used. This would mean 
to adopt the form of ideology. Not all Christians are proud 
of the outrages of some Crusaders. There is no reason to 
change course in that direction. Tender-mindedness in the 
sense of doing the near-at-hand (including caring for one’s 
‘enemies’), rather than blowing a Crusaders trumpet, is what 
Christianity has been taught to do. 
This is not tender-minded in the sense of idealistic 
weakness, as late-Modern James’s early-Modern predecessor, 
Machiavelli, had already tried to convince his contemporaries. 
Those nice impragmatic Christians
Intellectuals tend to focus on what other intellectuals say or do 
not say. Present-day philosophy of science provides a case 
in point. Philosophers of science do not go to laboratories to 
see what happens; neither do they read enough of scientists’ 
own narratives about their work – especially the lesser 
known ones on whose shoulders the great ones stood. They 
tend to read other philosophers of science and develop their 
own idiolect, not easily accessible for active scientists. I have 
indicated above that James confused theological doctrine 
with religious practice. The theology of the 19th century took 
the direction of deist or pantheist abstract Rationalism and 
this is what James attacks as ‘tender-minded’ Christianity.
Christians who have the strength to suffer are in fact people 
of action and determination. They are prepared to serve in 
circumstances of suffering; to suffer with those who suffer. 
Strength in suffering is not an end in itself; martyrdom is not 
something to be sought after; it is imposed by those opposed to 
fulfilment of calling. As with all worldviews, Christianity has 
its deviants. I do not believe it has more deviants than any 
other belief system. Yet present-day research indicates that 
in South Africa, charismatic Christians, sometimes ridiculed 
for the literal use of the Bible and their sentimentalism, have 
been doing and spending much more for the sake of the poor 
than the pretentious left wing government. 
One could also say that James was a late-ideologue. I do not 
use the prefix ‘post’, for it would be a denial of historical 
continuity, which is still present in and after any shift, 
howsoever radical. ‘Post-Modernism’ is rather more early 
Modern than after-Modern. James hung unto the ‘form’ of 
ideology – end-driven strategic thinking without ado. Like 
the ‘Post-Modernists’ – of which James may be a grandpa 
– James shares the ideological form with the proto-Modern, 
Machiavelli. The latter, followed by Hobbes, Rousseau, 
Voltaire and all of the French Revolution (and also Kant to 
a certain extent), adopted the Ancient pagan tribalist view 
of the state, impatient with people who would not serve 
their divinity. Or one could also say that James was a post-
Rationalist carrying (or being burdened by) suppressed 
Modern beliefs in the continuity of Western tradition. These 
include: 
• A trust in method that supposedly would guarantee both 
the correct way and the finding of the good life.
• A ‘denigration’ of Christian voluntary kindness, given its 
practical inefficiency and ineffectiveness, coming all the 
way from Machiavelli via the state absolutists and the 
utopians up to tough-minded Pragmatism. 
• A strong belief in a strictly ‘empirical scientific’ approach, 
although James, given his Pragmatist suppression of 
dogma, was a bit more playful in experimenting and 
observation than his Rationalist predecessors. 
• A deep conviction that conceptual work had to find its 
real fulfilment in practical activity and change, from a 
subjectivist pragmatist perspective, according to which 
the world has somehow to be force-fitted to our ideas, 
playing around with different ideas until we find the 
world’s soft underbelly from where to force it to play the 
game according to our rules. 
• A situationist (local) focus: doctrines have to work in 
specific situations and to a certain extent the situation, 
being problematic, was awarded a prescriptive role, a 
softened late-positivist scientism where laws, as expressed 
in rules, were supposedly but approximations validated 
by the level of their expected practical effects. (From the 
viewpoint of formal logic, this is the error of affirming the 
consequent.)
Really important from the perspective of his handling of the 
issue of religion, I believe the above summary of the traits of 
ideology-at-work shows its presence in James’s work. 
In the case of James the norms for his selection of aims 
and especially the Pragmatist means remain quite hidden. 
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However, in his criticism of religion it is clear that they are 
in the extension of Modernity’s striving for control for the 
sake of human advantage from a naturalistic perspective. In 
terms of these far-away ends James sets up his polar table 
to distinguish between the tender-minded and the tough-
minded and offers the Christians a conversion via Pragmatist 
purification, in order to find a god that has naturalistic, 
humanitarian effects. Pragmatistic methodistic purification is 
the shoes that should make the Christians’ idea-legs walk in 
the mud of human suffering. Given his scientistic blinkers, 
James overlooked the pragmatic value of Rationalism and 
the practical value of the Christian faith, classifying the latter 
in terms of the former, misunderstanding both as weak and 
impracticable. Surely Christianity is a very difficult faith-
practice: it is not simple or easy to love one’s enemy, to be 
obedient to inimical authorities, to forgive and try again. But 
what kind of hope does an empty method – empty efficiency 
of means, that will make the means the real ends – with a 
hidden hedonistic doctrine, offer?
In contrast, Christians with a strong philosophical profile, 
such as Blaise Pascal (1919:409) and Gabriel Marcel (cf. Venter 
2002) view such ‘weakness’ – that is non-EGO-ist ‘weakness’ 
over against the other – as exactly the nucleus of the dignity 
of the human being. 
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